I analyze two extensions to the standard model of life cycle labor supply that feature operative choices along both the intensive and extensive margin. The first assumes that individuals face different continuous wage-hours schedules. The second assumes that all work must be coordinated across individuals. These models look similar qualitatively but have very different implications for how aggregate labor supply responds to changes in taxes. In the first model, curvature in the utility from leisure function plays relatively little role in determining the overall change in hours worked, whereas in the second model it is of first order importance. The second model has important implications for what data is most able to provide evidence on the extent of curvature in the utility from leisure function.
Background and Introduction
Starting with the contribution of Lucas and Rapping (1969) and continuing with the development of modern business cycle theory by Kydland and Prescott (1982) , economists have sought to understand aggregate labor market outcomes using a framework in which individual economic agents solve explicit optimization problems and interact through explicitly specified market structures and/or other channels. One critique of early work in this research program concerned the relationship between individual and aggregate labor supply elasticities. Specifically, in the early representative agent models that dominated the literature and featured solely an intensive margin of labor supply, an exercise of the sort pioneered by MaCurdy(1981) would uncover the value of the key preference parameter that perfectly characterized both individual and aggregate labor supply responses. This raised an immediate problem, since the implied elasticities from micro data were much smaller than the implied elasticities from aggregate data. While some concluded that this inconsistency was evidence against the overall approach emphasized by this research program, in his discussion of Kydland (1984) , Heckman (1984) offered a different assessment. He suggested that the key underlying issue was that the models being used both in micro and aggregate studies were abstracting from key features of individual labor supply problems, limiting the usefulness of comparisons across these studies. Specifically, he argued that because adjustment at the extensive margin is so prevalent at the individual level, any compelling analysis that seeks to derive aggregate implications from individual choice prob-lems would have to incorporate an extensive margin into the analysis. 1 Given such a model, it was not clear what the implications would be for aggregate labor
supply, nor what the significance of the MaCurdy style estimates for prime aged males would be, since these estimates seemed only to reveal information about intensive margin adjustments for one groups of workers.
One interpretation of the comments in Heckman (1984) is that they issued a call to develop models which simultaneously capture the important margins of individual labor supply, allow for a rich structure of heterogeneity, and permit us to solve for aggregate outcomes. This would allow us to connect analysis of both individual and aggregate data in a consistent framework. A simple reality of economic analysis is that the quantitative implications of any particular model typically depend on the various features and parameter values that characterize the individual decision problems. Some features that are "realistic" may turn out
to not be quantitatively important in terms of substantive economic implications.
One of the key objective of economic research is to sort out the important from the not-so-important features in the context of specific issues that we want to address. To carry out this type of analysis in a consistent fashion requires exactly the sort of model just described.
Shortly after Heckman's (1984) comments, macroeconomists found a way to tractably introduce an extensive margin of labor supply into their models. Hansen (1985) introduced the indivisible labor assumption of Rogerson (1988) into an otherwise standard aggregate model. While in principle this could have facilitated a greater connection between these models and the micro data on labor supply, in fact it had somewhat of the opposite effect, the immediate effect was almost the opposite. A key property of these representative household models was that the aggregate labor supply elasticity was large independently of the value of the elasticity parameter estimated by MaCurdy and others. As a result, many macroeconomists viewed the indivisible labor assumption as a justification to not look at the micro data on labor supply, since one prominent component of the literature was focused on a parameter which was no longer relevant. Browning et al (1998) pointed out this disconnect from the micro data. In particular, while the equilibrium allocation that Hansen (1985) and others emphasized were an important improvement over the earlier models because of the presence of adjustment along the extensive margin, the individual employment histories in these models did not correspond at all to those found in the data. 2 The last ten years has witnessed some important extensions of the basic indivisible labor model, and puts us in a position to be able to address micro level observations and aggregate implications within a consistent model. Of particular interest is the work by Chang and Kim (2006 , 2007 , 2009 ). These authors study models that feature idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and indivisible labor choice. 3 In the context of this model, one can carry out the same types of 2 Browning et al (1998) claimed that the Hansen (1985) model implied equal employment probabilities next period for both the current employed and non-employed. In fact, the structure of the transitions is actually indeterminate. While this implies that the data are not inconsistent with the model, the model certainly does not help us understand why we see particular patterns in terms of movements between employment and non-employment. 3 These models follow the important earlier contributions of Huggett (1993) , Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998). individual level estimation exercises that MaCurdy (1981) and others performed, at the same time that one can examine the implications of aggregate shocks for aggregate hours of work in the spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1982) . 4 In the context of these models, the old micro data estimates do not turn out to be of great importance, at the same time that aggregate labor supply is somewhat less In summary, much has changed over the last 25 or so years. Viewed from the perspective of the current models that economists are using, the initial controversy about individual and aggregate labor supply elasticities based on importing the estimates of MaCurdy into aggregate representative agent models seems somewhat archaic. We can now explore which features are important in accounting for various aspects of micro level data and assess the importance of these features for various issues that involve aggregate outcomes. While we now have a solid foundation, there are still many open issues, dealing with such issues as the importance of various types of shocks, the nature of human capital accumulation, 4 Chang and Kim (2009) also revisits the contribution of Mankiw et al (1986) and shows that if one tries to interpret the aggregate data in this model as coming from a representative household that only adjusts labor along the intensive margin, that one obtains the same types of problematic results that these authors find, i.e., parameter estimates of the wrong sign and violation of concavity.
the importance of different sources of heterogeneity, the role of market structure, trading frictions, family structure etc....
Choice along the extensive margin figures prominently in the class of models just described. In these models the extensive margin is introduced by assumptionin any given period the individual is assumed to have only two choices-work some pre-specified number of hours, or work zero hours. At a descriptive level, this assumption seems empirically reasonable, corresponding to the observation that there is a great deal of concentration in the distribution of work hours, either at the weekly or even annual level. But while the assumption of indivisible labor is empirically descriptive, given its prominence in these models one might well ask what deeper forces lead to this concentration of working hours, and whether the aggregate properties of the model depend on the underlying cause of this concentration. In this paper I take a first look at this issue. In particular, I
consider two different extensions of a standard life cycle labor supply model that involve explicit choice along the intensive and extensive margins, each of which represents ideas that have been explored quite a bit in the labor supply literature.
In the canonical labor supply model, an individual can work any number of hours, and the wage per unit of time is fixed, leading to a linear budget equation. Many researchers have commented that many factors are likely to influence the nature of the constraint set that individuals face when making labor supply decisions, and the two models that I consider reflect some of these comments.
The first model that I consider assumes that workers face a (continuous) menu of hours and wage options, with the property that the wage per unit of time is increasing in the volume of work performed. 5 My analysis of this model largely summarizes recent work by Prescott et al (2009) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2007, 2009) . A key feature of this first model is that workers are still free to choose their hours of work in any given period, although the shape of the budget set is now altered.
The second model assumes that the work schedule (i.e., intensive margin) is a collective choice in the economy, and that once the work schedule is chosen, the only choice that an individual worker faces is whether to work at the going wage rate. This assumption is meant to capture the desire for coordination. The motives for coordination may come from the need for workers within and across firms to work together, or for individuals to coordinate leisure time and/or family schedules. I do not model the underlying reason for coordination, and in a well defined sense focus only the best outcome given the need to coordinate. A key feature of this model is that given a particular collective choice for the work schedule, a worker is not free to work any number of hours, and so it is typically the case that the hours of work for an individual is not consistent with the hours that he or she would choose to work in that period given the wage rate. A large literature documents that desired and actual hours of work typically diverge. 6 From the perspective of the individual worker, one can think of this model as one in which the worker faces a discontinuous menu of wage and hours choices, 5 Examples of papers that have documented the hours-wage menus include Moffitt (1984) , Altonji and Paxson (1988) , Biddle and Zarkin (1989) , Dickens and Lundberg (1993) , Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Aronson and French (2004) . The work of Cogan (1983) on fixed costs is also very relevant. 6 See, for example, Kahn and Lang (1991) , Bell and Freeman (2001) and Sousa-Poza and Henneberg (2003) .
with wages equal to zero for any hours choice other than the collectively decided value. But a key point is that the location of the discontinuity is determined by the collective choice rather than being a feature of technology.
Consistent with the data, both of these extensions to the standard life cycle model generate life cycle profiles for hours at the individual level in which adjustment at the extensive margin plays a key role. I provide analytic and graphical characterizations of optimal lifetime labor supply along the intensive and extensive margins for both models. In each case one can view the optimal choice as the intersection of downward and upward sloping curves in intensive margin-extensive margin space. The differing slopes of these two curves reflects the simple reality that from one perspective the two margins are substitutes, while from another perspective they are complements. The sense in which the two are substitutes is that from the perspective of generating income, one can generate income from increasing labor supply along either margin. The sense in which the two are complements is that from the perspective of efficient time allocation, disutility per unit of income earned should be equated along all margins. This implies that one should only more years if one is also working longer hours when working. From a qualitative perspective, these two models seem to have much in common.
I then consider how aggregate labor supply in these models responds to an increase in the scale of a simple tax and transfer program, and in particular, I
contrast them with the outcomes that emerge in the standard life cycle model with only an intensive margin of adjustment. The striking finding is that the two models with operative extensive margins for life cycle labor supply generate dramatically different aggregate outcomes. In the standard model in which the only relevant margin is the intensive margin, the aggregate response is tightly connected to the preference parameter that dictates curvature in the utility from leisure. Whether the response is large or small depends critically on this parameter. Consistent it also has important implications for empirical work that aims to uncover these factors, in particular the curvature parameter in the utility from leisure function. Specifically, this model implies that individual labor supply responds differently to idiosyncratic variation in driving forces than it does to aggregate variation in driving forces. If the work schedule is a collective choice, then it will be invariant to purely idiosyncratic variation, but not to changes in aggregate or common factors. The implication in the stark model studied in this paper is that analysis of micro data may not be sufficient in estimating this key preference parameter.
In particular, aggregate data may have a significant role to play in determining the value of this parameter. 7 An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 describes the three models and characterizes their implications for life cycle labor supply. Section 3 considers the implications of each model for changes in the scale of a simple tax and transfer program, both qualitatively and in some simple numerical examples. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis and Section 5 concludes.
Three Models of Life Cycle Labor Supply
In this section I describe three different models of life cycle labor supply. The first model is a standard model in which all adjustment in labor supply takes place along the intensive margin. The other two models both feature choice along the intensive and extensive margins. The first of these will consider the assumption, following Prescott et al (2009), of a nonconvex mapping from time devoted to work to labor services. As noted in the introduction, this assumption implies that workers face a menu of wage/hours combination when making labor supply choices. The second of these models will be the analysis that is novel to this paper, and will consider a case in which the individual is forced to choose a fixed work length for all dates at which labor supply is positive. This is meant to capture the notion that due to coordination issues, all production must be carried out with a fixed working schedule. If this work schedule were exogenously given, this would amount to the standard indivisible labor model of Rogerson and Hansen. But the novel feature here is that the work schedule is chosen by the worker at the beginning of life.
The Standard Life Cycle Model
Because the extensions that I consider next will have implications for the fraction of lifetime that an individual spends in employment, it is convenient to formulate the model in continuous time, so that the labor supply choice along the extensive margin is a continuous choice variable and can therefore be characterized using standard methods. Consider an individual with length of life normalized to one who has preferences defined by:
where c(a) is consumption at age a, h(a) is time devoted to market work at age a, u(·) gives the utility flow from consumption and v(·) gives the utility flow from leisure. We assume that these two function are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfy:
I assume that utility is separable between consumption and leisure. While this has counterfactual implications for the behavior of consumption over the life cycle in the analysis that follows, it serves to simplify the analytic presentation of the results and so is convenient for purposes of exposition. I have also chosen to assume that the individual does not discount future utility flows. As will become clear shortly, this serves to simplify the analytic characterization of the solution to the individual's maximization problem. I will focus on the case where the interest rate is also zero, so that these two factors will be offsetting as is standard in many macro models with infinitely lived agents.
Following much of the life cycle labor supply literature, I assume that the productivity of an individual's time varies systematically over the life cycle. In particular, if an individual of age a devotes h units of time to market production, I assume that this yieldsẽ(a)h units of labor services. In the numerical work that follows I will assume that the age profile for this productivity process follows the shape shown in Figure 1 .
A few remarks are in order regarding the assumed shape of this productivity profile. First, for reasons of analytic tractability, I am assuming that this productivity process is exogenous, and so in particular, I am abstracting from human capital accumulation decisions that may lie behind this profile. In the data, wages are not symmetric over the life cycle, in the sense that wages at the end of the life cycle are much higher than wages at the beginning of the life cycle. If one takes wages as exogenous and assumes complete markets for borrowing and lending, this can create a problem for a model that includes an endogenous retirement decision. The reason for this is that there is an incentive for individuals to try to avoid working in the early part of life in order to avoid the low wages during the period, and to instead work more at the later part of the life cycle when wages Alternatively, I could have assumed that productivity is constant over the life cycle, and instead considered a specification in which the utility from leisure varies systematically over the life cycle. In particular, I could have assumed that preferences are given by: The wage rate per unit of labor services is assumed to be constant and equal to w. The individual faces complete markets for borrowing and lending, so assuming as noted above that the interest rate on borrowing and lending is equal to zero, the present value budget equation is given by:
To this point I have only described a single agent decision problem. In the subsequent analysis I will want to consider this single agent problem in the context of a steady state equilibrium in an overlapping generations model. At the risk of trivializing the general equilibrium considerations, but with the gain of transparency, I will assume that we are considering a small open economy in which the real interest rate is exogenously fixed at zero, and that there is an aggregate production function that is linear in labor services with marginal product equal to A. 8 It follows that if the price of output is normalized to one, the equilibrium wage rate w must be equal to A. Assuming a new generation of identical individuals with total mass equal to one is born at each instant, in steady state a new born household will solve the decision problem depicted above.
Characterizing the solution to the individual's maximization problem is standard. The individual solves the following problem:
The solution to this problem will entail a constant flow of consumption, and hence the problem can be rewritten as:
Substituting the budget equation into the objective function, we obtain the following condition for an interior solution for h(a):
which can also be written as:
where μ is the marginal utility of consumption.
There are two different forms that the solution may take. One possibility is that the entire profile for h(a) is positive (except possibly for the two endpoints), as shown in Figure 3 .
The other possibility is that the solution has zero hours of work for an interval at the beginning and end of life, as shown in Figure 4 .
For reasons that will become clear subsequently, it is convenient to transform the maximization problem via a simple change of variables. In particular, instead of examining the optimal labor supply decision as a function of age, it will be For future reference it is of interest to note that if we were to assume that e(λ)
were constant, the solution would be that h is constant. Taking into account that the worker will choose a constant profile for consumption, the worker's maximization problem can be written as:
Note that the budget equation implicitly takes into account the fact that although compensation per unit of labor services is constant and equal to w, compensation per unit of time is non-linear in the number of hours devoted to market work. The importance of this feature is that it creates a force for concentration of working in λ space instead of age space. First note that ifh is sufficiently large, the key qualitative result is that instead of having a continuous solution for h(λ), we get a solution that drops discontinuously to zero at some point, implying a solution for h(λ) as depicted in Figure 8 .
Assuming an interior solution for h(λ), one gets the following first order condition:
We know that h(0) will be positive since this corresponds to the highest productivity for the individual, and the marginal utility of consumption at zero consumption is infinite. Given a value for h(0), it follows from equation (2.3) that any h(λ) > 0 must satisfy:
Given a value for h(0) one can solve for the entire profile for h(λ) that solves equation (2.4). Since e(λ) is decreasing, it follows trivially that h(λ) is also decreasing.
If the optimal h(λ) profile were interior at all values, we would be done at this point except for the determination of h(0). If it is not interior for all λ, the fact that productivity is decreasing in λ, implies that a simple reservation property holds:
Given a value for h(0) and the solution for h(λ) implied by equation (2.4), the optimal value of λ / * is found by solving:
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition for λ * is:
Combining this with equation (2.3) evaluated at λ = 0 gives:
Equation (2.6) represents an upward sloping relationship between h(0) and λ * .
The economic intuition behind this relationship is that an optimal time allocation must have the property that disutility per unit of income should be equated along all margins. So just as equation (2.4) implies that an increase in h(0) implies an increase in h(λ) for all λ, it is also true that an increase in h(0) implies that the individual should work deeper into the productivity distribution.
Given h(0) and the solution for h(λ) from equation (2.4), we can represent c as a function of h(0) and λ * :
Since c is increasing in λ * it follows that equation (2.7) represents a downward sloping relation between h(0) and λ * . This downward sloping relation represents the simple fact that in terms of generating consumption, the intensive and extensive choices are substitutes. That is, if an individual is working longer hours, the value of consumption at the margin from working more along the extensive margin is lower.
Assuming that the solution for λ * is interior, the intersection of these two curves is the solution to the life cycle labor supply problem for this individual.
For future reference, I note that if the productivity profile were constant, then the optimal solution would be that hours are constant and then drop discontinuously to zero at some point. This highlights the sense in which this model has a force that opposes the desire of the individual to have smooth hours of work.
Coordinated Working Times
In this section I add a different constraint to the standard problem. In particular, in the spirit of the need to coordinate working schedules, I assume that the worker must choose a fixed work schedule that applies to all periods in which labor supply is positive. Once the working schedule is fixed, the worker faces a simple choice between working and not working at the fixed schedule. In a setting in which workers are heterogeneous, there is a nontrivial issue associated with how to determine the standard work schedule, since different workers may prefer different values. Also, in a changing environment there is an issue about how the work schedule may be altered. I am purposefully abstracting from these potentially important issues in order to focus on some basic implications of this feature that are present even in the absence of these other issues. A more extensive discussion of these simplifications is postponed until later. The worker's problem can now be written as:
where in this problem h is the work schedule choice, and then I(λ) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function that represents the choice of whether to work given the fixed work schedule. As before, consumption will be constant over time, and as in the previous subsection, the employment decision will be characterized by a reservation rule: work when λ ≤ λ * . Of course, it is possible that the value of λ * is equal to one, implying that the individual works in all periods.
Taking this information into account we can write the maximization problem as:
where h is the choice of work schedule that will hold throughout the individual's lifetime, and λ * is the fraction of life spent in employment, which necessarily consists of the fraction λ * that has the highest productivity. It is useful to introduce the function G(λ * ) defined by:
Assuming interior solutions for both λ * and h we obtain the following first order conditions:
The first equation depicts a downward sloping relationship between λ * and h. The second equation depicts an upward sloping relationship between λ * and h. The intuition behind these two relations is identical to that offered in the previous subsection. It follows that one can depict the solution to this problem as the intersection of two curves, one of which is downward sloping and the other of which is upward sloping.
Comparisons
To contrast the three different solutions we begin by considering the extreme case in which the productivity profile is flat. In the benchmark case this necessarily leads to a flat profile for hours over the entire interval [0, 1]. In the case of coordinated working times the solution will be the same as in he benchmark model, since the coordinated working time problem is simply the benchmark problem with some additional constraints. But since the optimal solution satisfies the additional constraints, it follows that this solution must also be optimal in the presence of the additional constraint. In the case of the nonconvexity in the provision of labor services there are two separate cases to consider. One case is that the nonconvexity is not sufficiently large to be binding. The second case is that the nonconvexity is large enough to make the extensive margin operative. In the first scenario, the solution will have the same property as the solutions for the other two cases-if the nonconvexity is not binding then hours will necessarily be constant. In this case the nonconvexity acts just like a reduction in the wage rate. Depending upon the function u(·), this may shift the hours profile up or down relative to the other cases, but it will necessarily be constant. In the second scenario, the result will be constant hours when working, but the individual will only work for a fraction of his or her lifetime. The amount of work done while working will now be greater than in the other two cases. Now consider the models in which the e(λ) profile does change over time.
Assume also that the heterogeneity is sufficient to generate interior solutions for employment in all three cases. Figure 9 shows hours profiles for the three cases, imposing that lifetime labor supply is the same in all cases and that hours are positive for 70% of the individual's life.
While all three models produce outcomes in which the individual works for only a fraction of his or her life, a key distinction is that in the benchmark model the hours profile drops to zero continuously, while in the other two models the hours profile drops to zero discontinuously. This discontinuity in the life cycle profile for hours worked is a key distinguishing feature of the second and third models relative to the benchmark model. Another interesting distinction has to do with the profile for hours worked while working. In the work schedules model, the hours profile is flat for the region in which hours are positive, but in the other two models there is a positive relationship between hours and productivity in the region with positive hours. In this regard the first two models are similar, while the third is different. In terms of life cycle variation, the work schedule model looks like a pure indivisible labor model.
Tax and Transfer Programs
In this section I contrast the implications of the three models for how a simple tax and transfer program affects life cycle and aggregate labor supply outcomes. In particular, I will consider a policy that levies a proportional tax τ on labor income and uses the proceeds to fund a lump-sum transfer to all individuals currently alive, subject to a balanced budget constraint. This simple policy has been studied extensively in the literature on cross-country differences in hours of work and serves as a useful benchmark for contrasting the implications of these three models.
Analytic Results
It is easy to derive the implications of such a tax policy on the optimal labor supply choices of individuals. Recall that given the specification of the model we can interpret the changes in the individual choices as reflecting changes in the steady state equilibrium. In the case of the benchmark model, the first order condition that determines the optimal choice of h(0) becomes:
The condition that relates h(λ) to h(0) is unchanged, since the tax rate affects these choices in the same fashion:
The government budget constraint implies that:
Combining the government budget constraint into the first order condition for h(0) gives:
Because the solution for h(λ) as a function of h(0) is unchanged, it follows that the solution for h(0) is decreasing in τ .
Similar calculations can be done for the other two models. In both cases, taxes do not distort the conditions that relate optimal choices along the intensive and extensive margins. The reason is that both of these margins are distorted by taxes in the same fashion, so that the distortions cancel. In terms of a diagrammatic exposition, this implies that the upward sloping curve that relates optimal choices of intensive and extensive margins does not shift in response to a change in the tax and transfer system. But the tax and transfer scheme does distort the condition that relates total amount of time spent working to the marginal utility of consumption. This leads to a downward shift in the downward sloping relation.
It follows that in both cases an increase in the scale of the tax and transfer system leads to a decrease in hours worked along both the intensive and extensive margins.
It is also instructive to contrast the implications of the three models for the case in which there is no heterogeneity. In this case, it is easy to show that the benchmark model and the work schedule model will imply that all adjustment takes place along the intensive margin, whereas the nonconvex labor services model implies that all of the adjustment takes place along the extensive margin.
Numerical Examples
In this subsection I solve some numerical examples to further explore the responses studied analytically in the previous subsection. In order to do this one needs to choose functional forms and parameter values. I choose the standard form for the choice of the utility from leisure function: For the life cycle productivity profile I choose the quadratic specification:
Note that with log utility over consumption, the labor supply profile is invariant to proportional shifts in the productivity profile, so that there is no loss in generality in assuming λ(0) = 1. Table 1 . The fact that p 0 is decreasing in γ is intuitive. The smaller the value of γ, the more curvature there is in the utility from leisure function, and the greater is the desire to have a smooth profile for leisure. In order for the individual to choose a path for hours with a given change in hours as the worker moves between employment and nonemployment, one needs a greater incentive in terms of productivity differences. That is, in order to encourage the worker to go from h = .45 to h = 0 at λ = .7 / 4, a smaller value of γ requires a lower value of productivity at λ = .74.
Given the above choice of parameters, the benchmark model is also completely parameterized and so can be solved. For the model with a nonconvexity in the supply of labor services, there is one additional parameterh. For this model I fix p 0 = .65 and then chooseh and α so as to achieve the values λ * = .74 and
For the four different values of γ in Table 1 , the implied values ofh are given by .037, .13, .25, and .37 as γ increases from .10 to 1. Similar to the relation observed above, the greater the curvature in the utility from leisure function, the greater the nonconvexity must be in order to generate a solution in which the extensive margin is operative. percent. In contrast, when γ = .10, the effect is only about one-fifth as large.
The effect of heterogeneity on this result is relatively small. One point of interest in this table is that even in the context of this model, one can obtain a response along both the intensive and extensive margins. As the second column shows, when γ is large, there is a significant change along the extensive margin. But when γ is small, this response disappears.
Next we consider the case of the work schedule model. Results are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 Tax Effects in the Work Schedule Model The key result that emerges from this table is that both the aggregate response and the breakdown of this response into intensive and extensive margins is identical to that in the benchmark model. We postpone further discussion until we have presented results for the model with the nonconvexity in the supply of labor services. Table 4 reports these results. Table 4 Tax Effects in the Non-Convex Labor Services Model The results here effectively mirror those presented in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). First, and most importantly, the effect of γ on the aggregate response is relatively small. 9 For values of γ that are below .50, to a first approximation the effect of an increase in τ from .30 to .50 is for aggregate hours to decrease by about 17%. There is however, a large impact of γ on the response of hours worked at peak productivity. As detailed in the third column, when γ = 1.00 the decrease is 11%, while when γ = .10 the response is only 2%. This factor five difference
is similar to what we found in the two previous models, but what is different in 9 The effect of γ on the aggregate response in hours is somewhat larger in this table than in the corresponding results in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) . The main reason for this is they recalibrated the slope of the productivity profile as γ changed in order to keep the relative wage ratio constant over the lifecycle, taking into account the effect of the nonconvexity on compensation per unit of time.
this model is that at the same time that decreasing γ leads to a decrease in the response along the intensive margin, it leads to an increase in the response along the extensive margin.
Discussion
The main result that I want to focus on is the very dramatic difference between the work schedule model and the nonconvex labor services model. To pursue this a bit further, consider an individual who is near the point of peak life cycle productivity, and observe how this individual responds to an unanticipated change in the return to work at this point in time. If the unanticipated change leads to higher returns to work, there is no option for the individual to increase his or her hours of work, so we will necessarily not observe any change in hours of work in response to this event. One might falsely conclude that individuals are not very willing to substitute leisure, either across time or in return for additional consumption. Alternatively, suppose that the effect of the change is to reduce the return to work. If the period being considered is close to peak productivity, then in order for the change to bring about a change in hours worked at that point would require a sufficiently large change in the return to work to lower the return below that of the reservation productivity level e(λ * ). It follows that except for very large changes we would again observe no change for this individual. In either case, looking at contemporaneous responses at the individual level to idiosyncratic changes in the return to working would lead us to find effectively no response in hours worked. Yet the same change in the return to working, when relevant for all individuals might lead to a large change in aggregate hours worked.
The key point is that despite the wealth of changes that take place at the micro level, it may be that the responses of individuals to aggregate changes in the economic environment may play a key role in helping us uncover the key parameters of individual preferences. Put somewhat differently, the results in Chang and Kim (2006) show us that given a fixed working length per period, micro data on hours and wages does not provide information on the parameter γ.
At this point it is useful to remark on some of the features of the very simple work schedule model considered here. The work schedule model studied here is really nothing more than an example that can (hopefully) be useful in illustrating some basic points. But as a serious model that might be used to provide compelling guidance to either data analysis or the response of hours worked to policy changes it undoubtedly raises some basic questions. First, taking as given that one of the most robust patterns in the micro data is the increasing profiles for wages and annual hours worked over the life cycle, an important limitation of the work schedule model studied here is that it does not account for the increase in annual hours worked over the life cycle. One generalization of the model considered here that could address this issue would be to allow for the possibility that as individuals accumulate experience they perform different roles within an organization, and that some of these roles might require a different number of hours. For example, when an individual gets promoted from being a regular worker to being a supervisor, maybe he or she has to show up for work earlier and stay later in order to facilitate the opening and closing of the establishment.
The key point is that a work schedules model may incorporate the reality that different positions may be associated with different hours, with these differences reflecting factors from the production side. That is, even if wages and hours move together, the variation might be determined solely by features of production, and so not provide any information about preferences aside from the obvious revealed preference implication.
A second issues concerns the economy wide nature of the work schedule. While one might accept the fact that a given establishment must choose a work schedule that coordinates the working hours of its employees, it is somewhat less clear that this needs to be done across establishments. One might then expect to see different establishments with different work schedules, each one reflecting the desired work hours for different subsets of the population. In the simple model that I studied, this might seem a reasonable solution to the problem. But there are three issues to raise. First, it seems reasonable that for many establishments, it is important to understand that an important attribute of the business is its hours of operation, and that it is important to be available to deal with customers during what are perceived to be "usual" or "normal" business hours. Second, to the extent that establishments care about turnover, it is important to incorporate the potential productivity losses associated with solutions that would involve individuals moving across establishments whenever there was a change in their desired hours of work. Third, to the extent that there are some frictions in labor markets, establishments may need to take into account the work preferences of the "average" worker when creating a position.
Having raised these issues, it is of course also true that there are some differences in work schedules across establishments within industries, as well as across occupations or industries. Teachers have annual work schedules that are far different from many other occupations. It is plausible that this plays a role in the decision of some individuals whether to enter that occupation. But it is more likely that the selection relevant for this choice has to do with permanent differences in preferences as opposed to life cycle changes in the return to working.
There are also many jobs in which coordination of work schedules is viewed as less there are still many issues to be resolved, specifically in assessing the importance of these various features for the properties of aggregate labor supply.
